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LIST OF PARTIES
This appeal arises out of the alleged breach of a
contract action in the Fourth District Court, Juab County, before the Honorable Ray M. Harding,
Eckhoff,

Watson,

Watson

and

The original parties were

Preator

Engineering,

Inc., dba

Eckhoff, Watson and Preator Engineering, a Utah corporation, and
the defendants Ralph Memmott, Grace Memmott, Sandra Memmott, Sue
Memmott, Delbert
Crapo.

Crapo, Syrelds

Crapo, Trent Crapo and Kent

Mr. Ralph Memmott is appealing a finding solely against

himself for the payment of services rendered by plaintiff/respondent.
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STATEMENT OF JURISIDICTION
AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-2(h) (1953), granting jurisdiction to this Court
to hear and decide appeals when such case is transferred and
assigned by the Supreme Court for the State of Utah.

Defendant,

Ralph Memmott is appealing a judgment rendered by the Fourth
Judicial District Court in and for Juab County that (i) respondent substantially performed the services contracted for through
its field survey, office work and resulting work product; (ii)
that the defendant, Ralph Memmott entered

into an agreement

regarding such services with the plaintiff; and, (iii) that the
other named defendants have no liability under either the Complaint or the aforementioned agreement.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether or not the evidence supports the finding

that the respondent substantially performed the work requested
of it by the appellant.
2.

Whether or not the evidence sufficiently supports

the finding that the appellant, Ralph Memmott, and respondent
entered into a valid and binding contract.
3-

Whether or not the copy of the subject contract

was properly admitted into evidence over appellant's objections.
-1-

4.

Whether or not, under Utah law regarding mining

partnerships, the appellant, Ralph Memmott, entered into a contract on his own and not on behalf of the other named defendants .

APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Every partner is an agent of the partnership for

the purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name of any instrument
for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the
partnership of which he is a member, binds a partner, unless the
partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter and the person with whom he is
dealing has knowlege of the fact that he has no such authority.
2.

An act of a partner which is not apparently for

the carrying on of the business of the partnership in the usual
way does not bind

the partnership, unless authorized by the

other partners.
3.

Unless authorized by the other partners or unless

they have abandoned the business, one or more but less than all
of the the partners have no authority to:
a.

Assign the partnership property in trust for

creditors or on the assigneefs promise to pay the debts of the
partnership.
-2-

b.

Dispose of the goodwill of the business.

c.

Do any other act which would make it impos-

sible to carry on the ordinary business of the partnership.
d.

Confess a judgment.

e.

Submit

a partnership

claim or liability to

arbitration or reference.
4.

No act of a partner in contravention of a restric-

tion on authority shall bind the partnership to persons having
knowledge

of the restriction.

Utah Code Annotated, §48-1-6

(1953).

To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by other
rules adopted by the Supreme Court of this State or by Statute.
Rule 1002.

Requirement of Original.

-3-

Utah Rules of Evidence.

A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an
original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would
be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.
1003.

Admissibility of Duplicates.

Rule

Utah Rules of Evidence.

The original is not required, and other evidence that
the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if:
(1)

Originals lost or destroyed.

All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless
the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or
(2) Original

not

obtainable.

No original

can be

obtained by any available judicial process or procedure; or
(3)

Original in possession of opponent.

At a time when an original was under the control of
the party against whom offered, he was put on notice, by the
pleadings or otherwise, that the content would be a subject of
proof at the hearing, and he does not produce the original at
the hearing; or

-4-

(4)

Collateral matters•

The writing, recording, or photograph is not closely
related to a controlling issue.
other Evidence of Contents.

Rule 1004, Admissibility of

Utah Rules of Evidence.

-5-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant

(Ralph Memmott) was found

liable

for the

payment to respondent for certain surveying services rendered by
the respondent at the request of the appellant.
The defendants, and appellant, Ralph Memmott, hereinafter jointly referred to as "Memmott", appeared with counsel
for trial on January 6, 1987.

The Court, after hearing the

various testimony of the parties and other witnesses and, after
having reviewed the materials submitted as exhibits, found that
the respondent, hereinafter referred to as "EWP", and the appellant, Ralph Memmott, had entered into a written contract whereby
the respondent was to provide certain survey services to Memmott
and that Memmott had agreed to pay an estimated fee of $6,000;
that Ralph Memmott had entered into this agreement individually
and not for, or on behalf of, any of the other named defendants;
and, that the respondent had substantially performed the services contracted for and expended time and effort in excess of
that estimated, and that such expenditures were reasonable.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT
TO ISSUES ON APPEAL
The named defendants jointly own several placer mining
claims located in the Scipio, Utah area.
28, 29, 159).
-6-

(Transcript, pp. 13,

Interstate 15 (1-15) crosses through some of the defendants1 mining claims.

(Transcript, pp. 13, 24). As a result

of 1-15 crossing these various mining claims, the defendants had
become involved
State of Utah.

in certain condemnation

proceedings with the

(Transcript, pp. 14-16, 26-28).

Mr. Ralph Memmott and Mr. Delbert Crapo approached EWP
in late September 1983, for the purpose of establishing where I15 crossed these various mining claims.
24, 35, 64).

(Transcript, pp. 21,

The defendants had already identified and marked

the location of their subject mining claims on both the ground
as well as on government land office survey maps (hereinafter,
GLO maps), which they provided to EWP.

(Transcript, pp. 24, 27,

37, 49, 101).
1-15 was already marked and established on the ground
with its right-of-way survey markers installed on both sides of
1-15 and such right-of-way ran along 1-15.
Memmott

had

requested

EWP to locate 1-15 on their

mining claims through the surveying of the previously located
government section corner markers, which also marked the corner
boundaries

of the Memmotts1

subject mining

right-of-way markers running alongside 1-15.

claims, into the
Thereafter, EWP

was to trace 1-15 onto the GLO plat maps provided by Memmott
showing the exact location of 1-15, and also provide to Memmott

-7-

the

distances

and

measurements

from

each government

monument to the 1-15 right-of-way markers.

section

Additionally, the

respondent was asked to verify the surveys of the mining claims
as shown on Memmotts1 placer locators.

(Transcript, pp. 35, 37,

43, 48, 65).
Some time during the initial meeting, EWP quoted the
price of $45 per hour for a two-man survey team, plus a reasonable hourly rate for the necessary office work.

'(Transcript,

pp. 34, 35).
In October 1983, representatives of both EWP and Memmott met at the site of the subject claims, at which time Memmott showed EWP the previously located government section corner
survey markers as related to their mining claims.

(Transcript,

pp. 24, 27, 37, 49, 101). At this same time, Ralph Memmott and
EWP executed

a certain document.

Memmott believes that the

document was a standard work authorization form (Transcript, pp.
38-39) and EWP claims that the document was a contract showing
the estimated price of $6,000, along with other items.

(Trans-

cript, pp. 32-33, 59-60).
EWP?s

survey

crew spent

two days surveying

in the

field and sometime thereafter, EWP provided to Memmott the "asbuilt" location, along with the data showing the survey measurements and distances to 1-15, to just two of Memmotts1 subject

-8-

mining claims, using only two of the subject government section
corner survey markers that Memmott had shown EWP and which marked the corners of their various mining claims.

(Transcript, pp.

70,77-78, 104, 140). The number of government section monuments
that had been identified and shown EWP was in excess of twelve.
(Transcript, p. 49).
Thereafter, respondent sent to Memmott a bill seeking
the sum of $6,487.17, the bill showing 34 1/2 hours of field
survey work and another 74 hours of office work.
Respondent could have provided

the requested survey

measurements and distances from the subject government section
corner survey markers into the 1-15 right-of-way markers, as
identified and shown them by Memmott, but failed to do so, but
for two locations.

(Transcript, pp. 21, 43, 48-49, 51, 102,

103-106, 112-115, 117, 118, 122-123, 134, 136, 166-167, 169170).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
The evidence was insufficient to support the lower
courtfs finding that EWP substantially performed the work requested of it by Memmott.
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I.
The admission of a copy of the alleged operative document, under the circumstances of this case, was contrary to Rule
1003 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, nor does the evidence sufficiently support such admission or the courtfs finding that it
was a valid and binding contract.

III.
If the contract is found to be valid and binding as to
Ralph Memmott then, as per Utah law, it is likewise valid and
binding as regards the other named defendants.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE LOWER COURTfS FINDING
THAT EWP SUBSTANTIALLY PERFORMED
THE WORK REQUESTED OF IT BY MEMMOTT.
The lower court, per its Memorandum Decision, found
that EWP had substantially performed the services that Memmott
had requested.

Specifically,

"EWP has provided all existing survey ties,
location of defendants' mining claims in
relationship to the interstate highway as
indicated on the Department of Transportation's highway strip maps and further provided the defendant with a GLO map showing
the location of the interstate highway as
-10-

it related to the defendants1 claims. Such
survey work and office work as was performed by the [plaintiff] and the resulting
work product was sufficient to substantially comply with the intent of the parties
and to satisfy the needs of the defendants ."
It is here submitted that once the evidence that the lower court
presumably relied upon to support its findings is viewed in that
light most favorable to the court's decision, the insufficiency
of the same will become clear.

K.J. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700

P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Cambelt International Corp. v. Dalton, 69
U.A.R. 6, 8 (Utah 1987); Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982
(Utah 1986); Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250
(Utah 1985); Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757 (Utah 1985).
Although the lower court's findings do not point out
the specific bases of evidentiary support, it would appear that
such is based

upon EWP's providing

to Memmott, among other

items, Exhibits "3", "4", "10", "11" and "12" and primarily, Mr.
Watson's testimony regarding these exhibits.
As provided by the record, it is Mr. Watson's testimony that the GLO maps, (Exhibits "10" - "12"), were blank when
he received them from Memmott; that he thereafter took the legal
descriptions of the subject mining claims, verified

them and

then plotted and colored them in on the GLO maps.
Next, is Exhibit
maps, consisting of 13 pages.

"3", the

1-15

right-of-way

strip

On these, EWP shaded in the loca-11-

tion of the various claims.

Lastly, Exhibit " 4 % which is a

drawing showing two of the surveyed ties into the 1-15 right-ofway from two of the government section corner monuments, along
with the survey data showing the distances and measurements from
each government monument to the 1-15 right-of-way, as well as
certain comparative data.
Thus, from the foregoing exhibits, Mr. Watson's testimony and Mr. Grimshaw's testimony, the lower court found that
EWP had substantially performed the services requested of it.
As the cases cited at the outset make clear, it is not
this court's

prerogative

to upset the lower court's finding

where supported by sufficient and substantial evidence.

How-

ever, it is submitted that some review of the evidence by this
Court is necessary when an appeal is brought questioning the
sufficiency of the evidence so to make possible the determination that the lower court's finding was indeed substantially and
sufficiently supported by the evidence.

Accordingly, the fol-

lowing observations are made.
Memmott here concedes that the drawing, Exhibit "4",
is the type of information and data that the defendants were
seeking from EWP, except for the comparison data between the
"as-built" 1-15 versus that shown on the Utah Department of
Transportation strip maps.

And, by EWP's own testimony, Exhibit

-12-

"4" shows only two (out of at least 12) of the survey ties from
the subject government section monuments to the right-of-way of
1-15 (T. at p. 77), despite EWP having spent two days' worth of
surveying to gather the data as to each of the government section monuments shown to them by Memmott.

The continual reason

given for EWPfs inability to provide the same information for
each of the government monuments previously located by Memmott
was that there were only two places on the 1-15 right-of-way
strip maps from which EWP could compare the information that EWP
had personally field surveyed with the information that was on
the right-of-way strip maps.

(T. at p. 105).

However, and as

Memmott testified, he was already aware that EWP would not be
able to make any sort of comparison with the Utah Department of
Transportation strip maps in that such data was not available,
but Memmott only wanted the information regarding the distances
from each government monument to the 1-15 right-of-way markers.
(T. at pp. 139-140).

And, as was testified to by Mr. Watson,

Mr. Grimshaw and Memmotts1 expert witness, Mr. Ludlow, a drawing, similar to Exhibit

ff

4,f! could have been provided for each

government monument that EWP had surveyed into the 1-15 rightof-way, showing on each such drawing the distance and measurements as surveyed from each such monument to the right-of-way
markers.

The only difference between these drawings and Exhibit

-13-

"4" would be that there wouldn't be any comparative data between
what EWP had surveyed and what the Utah Department of Transportation showed on the strip maps as to the location of 1-15.
Both Mr, Watson and Mr. Grimshaw testified that this information
was available and that they had taken this data down in their
field notes through the two days1 worth of field survey work.
Further, Mr. Ludlow testified he could have provided the drawings, along with the sought information, for a third of the
cost.
As regards the GLO maps, it is only Mr. Watson that
testifies that he marked the subject mining claims onto the GLO
maps, Exhibits "10" - "12".

Both Ralph Memmott and Sandra Mem-

mott testified that it was they who had made any markings, with
Sandra Memmott also identifying some of her handwriting on the
subject GLO maps.
And, likewise, an examination of the 1-15 right-of-way
strip maps, Exhibit "3ff, shows no distinct borderline between
the subject mining claims.

Each claim simply melds one into the

other, lacking any data, once again, of any distances or measurements from the right-of-way to any government monuments which
would indicate where 1-15 was located in relation to the boundaries of the subject claims.

Again, it is uncontroverted that

EWP had this data and could have provided this information.

-14-

All the witnesses are in agreement that Memmott had
previously marked the relevant government section monuments and
then showed them to the EWP representatives.

The record is also

missing any explanation as to why EWP shows on its bill 34 hours
of actual field survey time while both Mr. Watson and Mr. Grimshaw testified that they put in two days1 worth of field surveying, 12 hours the first day and 13 1/2 hours the second day,
which produces an 8 1/2 hour discrepancy.
As is pointed out above, when the evidence that is
presumably supporting the lower court's finding is marshalled
and examined in a light most favorable to EWP, it can be seen
that such is insufficient to support such finding.

ARGUMENT II.
THE ADMISSION OF A COPY OF THE ALLEGED
OPERATIVE DOCUMENT, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, IS CONTRA TO RULE
1003 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, NOR
DOES THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT
SUCH ADMISSION OR THE COURTfS FINDING
THAT IT WAS A VALID AND BINDING CONTRACT.
As regards the Court's finding that Ralph Memmott and
EWP entered

into a valid

and binding contract, the evidence

supporting such appears to be based upon Mr. Watson's and Mr.
Grimshaw's testimony and, primarily, the admitting into evidence
of a copy of the alleged contract, Exhibit "1".

-15-

The record is clear that Exhibit " 1" is a copy and
that such was admitted over Memmott?s objections as being not
the original and therefore not the best evidence.

Apparently,

the court felt the testimony given regarding EWP's claim that
the original had been lost by one or the other party and could
not be found despite the diligent search made by EWP satisfied
Rules 1003 and 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
The admission into evidence of Exhibit "1" as based
upon Rules 1003 and 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in this
case conflicts with the standard regarding admissibility under
these circumstances.
While Mr. Grimshaw did testify that he saw Mr. Watson
filling the subject document in sometime during the lunch hour
on the first day of the field survey, which Mr. Watsonfs testimony tends to corroborate, it is also clear that only Mr. Watson
saw Mr. Ralph Memmott sign anything, despite Mr. Watson, Mr.
Grimshaw, Mr. Crapo and Ms. Memmott all being present at the
time.

Additionally, the record does not contain any testimony

from anyone other than Mr. Watson as to what terms he placed in
the alleged contract.

Not even Mr. Watson.

It would also appear that additional support was found
by the Court when Ralph Memmott testified that the document he
signed was merely a work authorization form containing no writ-

-16-

ing or printing on the sheet other than his signature appearing
in the left-hand bottom of the sheet.
The court admitted the subject document pursuant to
Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, presumably finding that
Mr. Watson1s explanation for the disappearance of the original
was sufficient to support such admission.

Such explanation is

in accordance with Rule 1003 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and
is also recognized as being necessary by our courts, as well as
our sister states, under certain circumstances and conditions.
Meyer v. General Amer. Corp. v. McCurtain, 569 P.2d 1094, 1096
(Utah

1977); Velasquez v. Freeman, 415 P.2d

514 (Or. 1966);

Freightliner Corp. v. Gyles, 521 P.2d 1, 5 (Or. 1974); High v.
Davis, The Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Skyline Enterprises Inc.;
582 P.2d 725, 735 (Or. 1978).
Clearly, the admission of this duplicate, under this
case and its circumstances, violates both subparts of Rule 1003.
It is submitted that Mr. Memmottfs testimony is important and tends to cloud the question of authenticity, which
is necessary for admissibility, in that it is also reasonable,
given

Mr. Memmottfs

considerable

past mining

experience and

familiarity with these types of standard forms, that he would
remember what it was he signed and what it showed on its face.
Mr. Memmott denies, and has always denied, that he ever signed
any such agreement.
-17-

It is also reasonable that he would have recalled if
there had been printing of some sort and to some extent on the
face of the document spelling out any terms.

The question is

raised as to why Ralph Memmott would sign any document showing
an estimated price well over what he believed EWP had quoted him
at the first meeting.
Further, and

upon

examination

of Exhibit

"1", one

notices that there are two dates appearing on its face.

One is

October 2, 1983 and appears to be the date when EWP executed the
alleged contract.

Mr. Memmott's signature appears, dated on

October 17, 1983.

And yet, both Mr. Watson and Mr. Grimshaw

have testified that the alleged document was filled in by Mr.
Watson on the first day of the field survey, or October 17,
1983.
Lastly, it is Mr. Watson1s testimony regarding the
efforts he put into trying to locate the original document.
pp. 60-61).

(T.

This explanation falls short where he claims dili-

gence in searching for a document that isnft in the usual place
that an original is kept per EWPfs usual business practice and
then trying to cover for this by stating that he contacted Ralph
Memmott in an attempt to locate the original of the document.
Mr. Memmott testified that the first time he ever saw
the subject document was when he was served with a Complaint in

-18-

this action and it appeared as an exhibit to the Complaint.
Note two things:

1) Ralph Memmott has always denied seeing or

signing this document; and, 2) EWP made but one request for the
document, be it the original or a copy, through its discovery.
At which time the defendants1 response was that EWP already had
the requested document.

No other attempts were made or appear

of record as to the subject document.
The real importance of this inquiry is contained in
the language of subpart 2 of Rule 1003 in that, under the circumstances of this case, it is obviously unfair to admit this
copy.

As stated in the preceding cases and the 1987 Utah case

of Billings v. Nielson, 738 P.2d

1047 (Utah App. 1987) at p.

1049:
"Rule 1002 exists because presenting to the
court the exact words of some writings is
of more than average importance, particularly in dispositive or operative documents.
A slight difference in words may
result in a great difference in rights."
(Emphasis added).
It is submitted that this is precisely the situation we have
here.

For instance, without Exhibit "1", we have only Mr. Wat-

son's oral testimony that the $45 per hour charge for a survey
team was not made.
suggests otherwise.

Both Mr. Memmottfs and Mr. Crapofs testimony
Likewise, it is the only document showing

any other dollar estimates for any type of services as well as

-19-

providing a written listing of what the services allegedly were,
all of which favors EWP.

Without Exhibit "1", EWP's case comes

down to a weighing of Mr. Watson1s testimony against that of Mr.
Memmott's, Mr. Crapo's, Mr. Ludlow's, and Ms. Memmott's.

In

fact, to some extent, even Mr. Grimshaw's testimony conflicts
with Mr. Watson's.
The same arguments as discussed above come into play
as regards the question of whether the evidence supports the
court's finding

that Mr. Memmott and

EWP signed a contract.

Without Exhibit "1", the evidence is unclear as to what the
terms of their agreement is, as only Mr. Watson saw Mr. Memmott
sign the alleged contract.

But, EWP can't find the original

despite a "diligent" search therefor.

The copy, however, con-

veniently shows up, and despite being wholly in EWP's favor and
changing the terms of the deal to something other than what both
Mr. Crapo and Mr. Memmott have testified to, is admitted and
found to be a valid and binding contract.

The weight of the

evidence, as suggested above, shows otherwise.
There are simply too many questions left unanswered as
well as many inferences that stand out with regard to the alleged contract that would allow such to be admitted without the
original pursuant to Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
let alone the insufficiency of the evidence supporting the find-
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ing that such was a valid and binding contract in light of Exhibit "1" being the only basis for such finding.

ARGUMENT III.
IF THE CONTRACT IS FOUND TO BE
VALID AND AND BINDING AS TO RALPH
MEMMOTT THEN, AS PER UTAH LAW, IT
IS LIKEWISE VALID AND BINDING AS
REGARDS THE OTHER NAMED DEFENDANTS.
As was recognized by the 1908 Utah case of Bentley v.
Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736, a mining partnership will be
found to exist where there exists the two prerequisites of joint
ownership and operation of the land for mineral purposes.

See,

also, Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, et. al, Christensen
Diamond Products v. Covey, et. al, 2 Utah 2d 85, 269 P.2d 854,
858 (Utah 1954).

There need not be specific partnership docu-

mentation or an agreement as long as the joint ownership and
operation of the land for mineral purposes exists.

Further, it

has been found that the operation of the claim need not be on an
equal footing.

As long as the above prerequisites exist, there

can be a division of the duties and responsibilities of management and operation of the claims without destroying the partnership.
859.

Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, et. al, supra, at p.
A mining partnership has "developed as a special type of

partnership peculiarly adapted to serve the mining industry."
Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, et. al, supra, p. 857.
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The testimony establishes that the named defendants
were co-owners in the subject claims.
159).

(T. at pp. 13, 28 and 29,

This was also understood by EWP by virtue of the Com-

plaint naming the individuals as it did.

Further, and given

Ralph Memmottfs 36 years of experience as a professional miner
and his close relationship to the co-owners, his representation
of the others would seem only natural.
The record

nowhere indicates that EWP thought that

Ralph Memmott was not representing the others when he and Mr.
Crapo first contacted EWP.

Additionally, if one were to review

Utah Code Annotated, §48-1-6 (1953), such finding appears to run
counter to this as well.

There is no evidence that Ralph Mem-

mott did not have this authority, nor is there any evidence that
EWP was provided with any information that Ralph Memmott could
not act on behalf of the others.

Again, given Ralph Memmottfs

experience as a professional miner, the close relationship between all the named defendants, and that on at least one of the
days in the field, Sandra Memmott was present along with Mr.
Crapo and Mr. Memmott, and offered no objection to EWP's presence and the anticipated work, further buttresses the acceptance
of Ralph Memmottfs judgment regarding the claims and his representation of the others in this regard.
Consequently, and

as was

pointed

out

in Memmott's

Motion for a New Trial, the lower court's finding that the con-22-

tract, Exhibit "1" herein, only bound Ralph Memmott is contra to
both Utah Code Annotated §48-1-6 (1953), and the case law which
has developed in the area of mining partnerships.

As a further

consequence, Ralph Memmott is entitled to contribution from his
partners should the lower court's judgment be affirmed.

Jensen

v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1973).

CONCLUSION
As the cases in this area tend to point out, there is
a fine line between sufficiency and insufficiency of evidence
supporting any court's finding.

Due to the fineness of this

line, it is appropriate that the trial court be given a great
amount of discretion in coming to this determination without the
risk of it being overturned as a result of one party or the
other being dissatisfied with the decision.

However, this Court

has also recognized that when a finding is made by a lower court
which is not supported by the weight of the evidence, such a
finding does in fact need to be reviewed to establish this sufficiency of evidence and, if lacking, something done to rectify.
It is submitted that this case falls within this latter category
and, as is demonstrated above, the findings of the Court do not
comport with the weight of the evidence.
respondent and Mr. Memmott entered

The finding that the

into a valid and binding

contract, as shown above, also suffers from this same problem.
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Further, it appears that the admission of the subject
document into evidence, despite the Best Evidence Rule, was also
insupportable pursuant to the standards of the cases provided
herein and Utah's own Rules of Evidence.
Lastly, and because of the existence of a mining partnership as between the named defendants herein, the ability of
one partner (Ralph Memmott) to bind the others where such is
done pursuant to the business is clear.

The lower court's find-

ing as to liability on the part of only Mr. Ralph Memmott ignores the general idea behind partnership and that of contribution from the other partners where one partner is required to
make payment in the line of the partnership interests and business .
Accordingly, it is respectfully

requested

that the

lower court's findings be reversed for the reasons stated herein.
DATED this

day of January, 1988.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
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Attorney for Appellant
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